

was happening below, and they were filmed by cameramen on the ground. . . . It was after 1 P.M. when the blockaders arrived. . . . [They] held a sit-in, and that's where they were arrested later, peacefully, symbolically, and above all—photogenically." (Howard Rosenberg, *Los Angeles Times*.)

■ That there is no dissension in revolutionary Iran is confirmed by the election of their third ruler this year, with 95.02 per cent of the vote, not to mention by the smooth elimination of dissenters, now at the rate of a hundred a day or more.

■ Sometimes bad news travels slowly, but last November the Oxford Union did it again. Back before World War II, the same outfit affirmed the Joad resolution, that "This House will in no circumstances fight for its King and Country." Last November, the Union voted on the proposition that "This House regrets the decline of American power and influence over world affairs." That House did *not* regret it, by a margin of 2 to 1. The negative case was argued by a Christ Church scholar named Belial.

Sadat: The Politics Of Assassination

In recent months, the finger of assassination has pointed in the direction of three men who have important things in common. All three are—and this would be conceded within the West even by those who disagree with them—*good* men, manifestly good; and also *courageous* men. Purely by being what they are—even apart from their policies—all three have wielded power in the international political equation.

Pope John Paul II immediately became a global presence. He is a powerful factor in the Soviet Union's Polish Problem. He is admired by millions who are entirely outside Catholic doctrine. A Turkish assassin, trained in Libya, nearly killed him.

President Reagan was shot by a lovesick weirdo. But Jack Anderson now reports, working from intelligence sources, that a Libyan plot against Reagan's life exists.

After the Camp David agreements, Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, the Libyan dictator, put a \$10-million price on Sadat's head. This was later raised to \$15 million. In the same period, beginning under President

Nixon, the U.S. spent \$6 million to guard Sadat's life.

Sadat was one of the great men of our time. The British military rites at his funeral, however, held some irony. As an Egyptian nationalist, Sadat had sided with the Germans in World War II and was jailed by the British. He had sided with the enemy of his enemy. Later he said that a German victory would have been disastrous for Egypt.

He was, of course, an authoritarian ruler—and it is worth pausing over the striking fact that this has not been much commented upon. The media are unremittingly hostile to, for example, Chile and Argentina, but—at least where Sadat was concerned—they did seem to grasp the fact that a qualitative difference existed between his authoritarian rule and the kind of thing presided over by Qaddafi.

No one paid much attention to Sadat while Nasser held center stage, but, when he came to power after Nasser's death, Sadat attempted to change the world—and in part succeeded. He made the decision that Egypt would not become a Soviet client state. Then he threw out the Soviet ambassador and several other Soviet diplomats, and gave seven hundred Soviet advisors one week to go home. Sadat turned Egypt toward the West.

The Israelis had demolished Egyptian pride in the Six-Day War. Sadat rescued it in the Yom Kippur War, crossing the Suez and momentarily throwing the Israelis back. But then he also had the lonely, existential courage to go to Jerusalem, speak to the Knesset, and begin the peace process. Without Sadat's initiatives, Camp David would have been unthinkable. Before Camp David, the blundering Carter had been moving toward a Geneva Peace Conference, with the Soviets playing a renewed political role. Sadat knew a bad thing when he saw it.

Sadat, tragically, may have placed too much faith in the U.S.—in its willingness to deliver on the West Bank and on the Palestinian issue. Sadat got the Sinai, but the rest of the Arab world got zero. Begin quoted the Old Testament, and Israeli settlements mushroomed on the West Bank. Sadat was isolated in the Arab world.

For sheer human decency, add to Sadat's record the fact that he was the only world leader willing to give the deposed Shah a place to die peacefully. All the others were too busy kissing the Ayatollah's foot.

Sadat's pro-Western politics and his peace with Israel made Moslem fanatics his mortal enemies. A defecting Egyptian general, bankrolled in Libya by Colonel Muammar el-



Qaddafi, masterminded the plot that succeeded in killing him. Qaddafi combines Moslem fanaticism with strong Soviet ties. He has already threatened the new Egyptian leader, Hosni Mubarak, with assassination if he continues Sadat's policies. Qaddafi, on TV from Tripoli, rejoiced at Sadat's murder, and in Beirut PLO guerrillas danced in the streets.

Qaddafi is intolerable. He is a suitable strategic and moral object of Egypt's secret service.

As for the U.S., our commitment to help guard Sadat logically evolves into a commitment to help chase down his killer.

Reagan's Strategic Mix

So the U.S. will get MX missiles—some to be ensconced in beefed-up old Titan silos, others to be deployed in ways still undetermined, but none to be circulated around sprawling ambits in the Western wilderness. Also—to help fill in strategic gaps until such time, still indefinite, as the hypothetical Stealth bomber becomes a practicable reality—the B-1 bomber project, in two versions, will get a reprieve from oblivion.

Those were the attention-grabbing elements in the \$108-billion five-year strategic development program announced by the President and delineated by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. But there were other significant items, such as continued production of cruise missiles and conversion of B-52 bombers to ferry them, a slight slowing of Trident submarine production (to one a year), development of a heftier and more accurate type of submarine-launched ballistic missile with increased range, correction of vulnerabilities in command-control-communications systems, and a pledge of more energetic endeavors in civil defense. Additional projects—passed over in the presentation but bruited in technical journals—concern radar-proofing of cruise missiles, fighter planes, and bombers.

There are many questions. Will hardening up old missile silos help much to offset the improving accuracy of Soviet targeting? Will the B-1 bomber as finally available retain the formidable characteristics originally projected for it? Is a Stealth bomber that is big enough to carry a significant payload practicable? The central critical question is whether all the planned efforts in combination are sufficient to maintain a second-strike capability and thus to avert the prospective dangers summed up in the awkward metaphor of a window of vulnerability.

That phrase refers to a period of heightened threat posed by the Soviet Union's multiple-warhead SS-18s against U.S. land-based intercontinental missiles—with the U.S. forced to rely on launch-on-warning or

Babel Rebuffed

The Feds are starting to conclude
That teaching English may be shrewd.
With knowledge of the common tongue,
Some kids may get a job while young,
Vote, watch Dan Rather, or pursue
The latest NATIONAL REVIEW.
Although it's still too soon to tell,
What slips from Secretary Bell
Suggests bilingualism's through.
In New York, I shall not boo-hoo.

W. H. VON DREELE

launch-under-attack as a strategic deterrent. Such is a sure formula for strategic instability—and in extremity a hopeless expedient. The now jettisoned scheme for roving land-based MXs was conceived precisely as a safeguard against that sort of predicament.

That central question brings one to the existing limitations on anti-ballistic-missile systems—due for re-evaluation next year under terms of the SALT I Treaty. It is time for a prudent new look at ABM systems as an offset to Soviet offensive preponderance. One thing is certain: the Soviet Union is not going to abandon its strategic advantages in deference to U.S. importunities for reductions.

Come The Counter-Counter-Revolution

Just as panic over Reaganomics began fading away in quarters such as Wall Street and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), it appeared within the Reagan Administration itself.

In September, CBO Director Alice Rivlin astonished Congress with her projections of declining budget deficits over the course of the Reagan Administration, and the Wall Street firm of Drexel, Burnham, Lambert published its view that “the evidence is mounting that we are moving in the direction of a lower inflation rate.” The same month, the Reagan Administration began backing away from its program.

First, the Administration rewrote its explanation of inflation. Formerly the cause was held to be excessive money creation, and the remedy was tight money. After the rewrite, the blame for inflation is on budget deficits—which, as it happens, worsen under a regime of tight money. Now you know why Secretary Regan and Council of Economic Advisors Chairman Murray Weidenbaum ceased calling for the Fed to tighten and began calling for the Fed to loosen. The inflation rate